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Interests and Animals, Needs and Language
I n Interests and Rights / The Case
Against Animals /1 R. G. Frey believes
he has animal rights advocates firmly
skewered on the horns of a dilemma:
(1)
Animal rights advocates
agree that "all and only beings
which
(can)
have interests
(can)
have
moral
rights. "
Frey labels this "the interest
requirement. "2
(2) I nterests must be divided
into needs and desi res. 3
(3)
If "interests"
in
(1)
refers to needs, then plants,
tractors, cave drawings, and
other mere things (can) have
interests and /
consequently /
(can) have moral rights (at
least as far as the interest
requi rement
is
concerned) .
But this is so counter-intuitive
as to be unacceptable even to
animal rights advocates. 4
(4)
If "interests"
in
(1)
refers to desires, animals can
not have them and, conse
quently / cannot have moral
rights.
Animals cannot have
desi res because (a)
having
desires
requires
beliefs
or
self-consciousness, (b) both of
these require linguistic ability,
but (c) animals lack linguistic
ability.5
Thus, Frey claims that a careful anal
ysis of "interests" shows that the
claim that animals (can) have moral
rights either leads to absurdity or is
false.

Frey is wrong on both counts. If
the interest requirement refers to
needs / it does not follow that plants /
artifacts, and other mere things (can)
have moral rights, for plants, arti
facts/ etc. / do not have the kinds of
needs which generate interests.
If

the i nte rest req u i rement refe rs to
desires, it does not follow that animals
cannot have interests, for having
desires does not require linguistic
ability / since neither believing nor
self-consciousness requires this abil
ity.
I.

Needs

Frey distinguishes having an inter
est from taking an interest, generally
using "need" for the former and
"desire" for the latter. According to
Frey, one has an interest in or needs
X if X contributes (will contribute,
would contribute) to his good or
well-being. One need not care about
this relation or even be aware of it
for this need to exist.
For example,
one needs vitamin C for good health
whether or not one cares about or is
even aware of this.
Frey then goes
on to remind us that plants, artifacts,
and other mere things can be intelli
gibly said to need things ("tractors
need oil") / to be harmed or benefited
("the Rembrandt painting would be
harmed by exposure to the sun")' to
be good of their kind ("that's a good
example of a night blooming jasmine"),
and to have things that are good for
them ("a sunny corner protected from
the wind is a good place to plant this
kind of shrub").
He concludes from
this that if we interpret the interest
requirement as referring to having
needs, then plants, artifacts, and
other mere things (can) have moral
rights. 6
But would we ordinarily say, as
Frey does, that "it is in a tractor's
interests to be well-oiled"? 7 I think
not.
While "need/" "want/" "Iack/"
"good/" "harm/" and "benefit" are all
commonly applied to plants, artifacts,
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etc., "interest" is not.
"Interest" is
ordinarily reserved for the people and
other animals who will benefit or. be
harmed by the needs of the plants,
artifacts, etc., being met or unmet.
For example, the tractor "needs oil,"
but it is "in the farmer's interest,"
not the tractor's, that his tractor be
well-oiled.
Again,
wheat
"needs
water" to su rvive and flou rish, but it
is "in the farmer's interest," not the
wheat's, that his wheat be properly
watered.
Thus, the ordinary use of
"interest" tells us that plants, arti

facts, and other mere things not only
take no interest in what benefits or
harms them; they also have no inter
est in these things.
So, "having a
good of one's own," "being capable of
being benefited or harmed," or, sim
ply, "having a need" does not provide
an adequate analysis of having an
interest.
Consequently, by basing
the reductio in his dilemma on inter
preting having an interest as having a
need, Frey has refuted a strawman.
Setting aside special legal and eco
nomic meanings of "having an inter
est," I would offer the following as a
more adequate interpretation of that
concept:
P has an interest in X if
and only if X affects (will affect,
would affect) P's feelings of well-be
ing. I understand "feelings of well
being" to refer to such feelings as
pleasure and pain, feeling well and
feeling ill, elation and depression,
feelings of fulfillment and of frustra
tion, and the many other feelings
which contribute to or detract from
the enjoyment of or satisfaction with
life. 8
This
interpretation
can
readily
explain why people can unknowingly
have an interest in vitamin C, trac
tors being well-oiled, and wheat being
properly watered, while plants, arti
facts, and other non-feeling things
cannot have an interest in anything.
Furthermore, distinguishing affective
needs, which generate interests, from
non-affective needs, which do not
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generate interests, can explain why
some people do not even have an
interest (and, consequently, justifia
bly take no interest) in some things
they can properly be said to need.
For example, suppose that I am defi
nitely overweight and would need to
exercise regularly and watch my diet
in order to slim down but that I do
not mind being fat and that my over
all enjoyment of life will not be dimin'
ished by my being fat.
Perhaps my
being fat prevents me from engaging
in certain activities I would have
enjoyed and will shorten my life some
what, but is is also an important con
tributor to my happiness, since my
fine tenor voice, which I love and
from which I profit handsomely, could
not be as fine without the fat and
since the crowd I go with and whose
company I greatly enjoy feels more at
ease and jolly with fat people.
Fur
thermore, exercising and dieting might
be highly unpleasant for me and would
certainly deprive me of one of my
dearest pleasures, eating with aban
don.
I n this way, being fat might
give me a somewhat shorter but
over-all happier life than would being
slim. In this case, although it might
be good for me to lose.weight (i.e.,
be "good for my health" or "necessary
for good health"), I could properly
claim that it is not in my interest to
spend my time exercising and watch
ing my diet.
It is in my interest to
spend my time fulfilling those needs
which will enhance my enjoyment of
life and to neglect those needs which
will not.
Pursuing good health is
usually in one's interest, since good
health is important for one's feelings
of well-being, but when that pursuit
undermines those feelings, it ceases to
be in one's interest.
Thus, not
merely whether one needs X but
whether X will affect one's feelings of
well-being seems to be the crucial
factor in having an interest in X. 9
Applying this more adequate inter
pretation of having an interest to the
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interest requirement, it follows that
all and only those beings which (can)
have affective needs (can) have moral
rights.
This
certainly
excludes
plants, artifacts, and other non-feel
ing things from having moral rights.
So, Frey's reductio fails.
Further
more, since Frey acknowledges that
some animals can at least "suffer
unpleasant sensations," 1 D it would
seem to follow that he must agree that
some animals have affective needs
and, consequently, have interests and
meet the interest requirement for hav
ing moral rights.
II.

Desires

Frey draws a distinction between
desires which req'uire beliefs such as
"I don't have X," "I would be better
off if I had X," and "in order to get
X, I have to do Y" and "simple
desires," such as wanting food, which
are reflexive and cannot, therefore,
involve the
mediation of
beliefs,
although
having any such simple
desires, he insists, requires that at
least some of one's simple desires
involve self-consciousness. Frey then
argues that
animals
cannot
have
desires of either sort,
for both
believing
and
self-consciousness
requi re language, and animals are
incapable of using language. 11
Frey offers the following argument
to show that only .Ianguage users can
believe:
Now what is it that I believe?
I believe that my collection
lacks a Gutenberg Bible; that
is, I believe that the sentence
'My collection lacks a Guten
berg
Bible'
is
true.
In
expressions of the form 'I
believe that . . .', what fol
lows the 'that' is a sentence,
and what I believe is that the
sentence in true.
The
essence of this argument is .
about what is believed.
If
what is believed is that a

certain sentence is true, then
no creature which lacks lan
guage can have beliefs.
.. I
do not see how the cat can be
correctly described as believ
ing the laces are tied unless it
can,
as
I do,
distinguish
between the beliefs that the
laces are tied and that the
laces are untied and regards
one but not the other as true.
But what is true or false are
not states of affai rs wh ich
reflect or pertain to these
beliefs; states of affairs are
not true or false (though sen
tences describing them are)
but either a re or a re not the
case. 12
Thus, Frey contends that when some
one believes something,
what he
believes is that a certain sentence is
true. Frey believes this because (1)
in bel ief statements sentences are
used to express what is believed and
(2) what one bel ieves is that some
thing is true (or false), and sen
tences are the sorts of things that are
true (or false).
Both of these argu
ments are seriously faulty.
(1)
Which grammatical forms are
employed in expressing the objects of
intentional verbs is one issue; what
those intentional objects are is another
issue, and an answer for the fi rst
issue is no more an answer for the
second issue than linguistics is a sub
stitute for psychology.
The proper
conclusion of Frey's analysis of belief
statements is that in order to under
stand such statements, one must be
able to understand sentences.
This
conclusion is neither controversial nor
relevant to the issue of whether ani
mals can believe: it is relevant only
to whether animals can formulate or
respond to belief statements.
Furthermore,
using
intentional
verbs whose objects are sentences in
referring to and describing animals is
a common practice. We commonly say
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such things as "the dog thin ks the
cat is in the tree," "the bird realized
that

one

of

its

chicks

is

missing,"

"the cat recognizes that the ice is
slippery," "the monkey sees that
strangers are invading his territory,"
" the deer senses that we are closing
in on it," "the zebra smells that a
leopard is near," and "the horse
hears that it is being called."
In
saying such things we do not presume
that the dog, for example, thinks of
the sentence "the cat is in the tree"
or that it cou Id assent to that sen
tence, if asked whether it is true.
Nonetheless, we understand the above
sentences, know when they do and do
not apply, and, in general, use them
without problem. Thus, ordinary lan
guage does not support Frey's con
tention that if an intentional verb
takes a sentence for its object, then
it properly applies only to those capa
ble of understanding sentences. 13
Frey might counter that this just
shows how pervasive is the pro-animal
prejudice.
However, such a claim
reminds one of the band member who
claims that he's okay; it's the rest of
the band that's out of step. If ordi
nary language philosophy has taught
us anything, it has taught us which
to choose when we have to choose
between ordinary language being non
sensical and a philosophical analysis
being mistaken. 14
Another problem with Frey's argu
ment is that if we were to apply his
pattern of analysis to other intentional
verbs, we would arrive at the follow
ing reductio of his position: just as
animals are incapable of belief, they
are incapable of hearing, for when I
hear that someone is coming, what I
hear is that the sentence "someone is
coming" is true, but animals are not
capable of doing this. Again, animals
cannot smell, for when I smell that
something is burning, what I smell is
that the sentence "something is burn
ing" is true, and animals cannot

formulate or understand sentences.
Such conclusions seem either to be
preposterous or to indicate that stipu
lative definitions of "hear," "smell,"
and "believe" are being used. Such
abnormal definitions could be based on
what Malcolm has described as "the
prejudice of philosophers that only
propositional thoughts belong to con
sciousness. "15
It might be thought that Frey is
not really faced with the preceding
dilemma, for he does not claim that
his analysis applies to all intentional
verbs.
However, nothing in what
Frey says indicates that his analysis
is restricted to believing. Since per
ceptions, like beliefs, can be true or
false and since "hear that," "see
that,"
etc., can
be parsed
like
"believe that" to take sentences as
their objects, it would be arbitrary to
try to escape the problems of the
previous paragraph by insisting that
Frey's analysis applies only to believ
ing.
Finally, it may be thought that
Frey can escape all the preceding
objections, since he claims that
though it may be thought that
my analysis of belief requires
persons to entertain the con
cept of a sentence in order to
have beliefs, this in fact is not
the case. . . . The sentence
'John believes that the window
is open' . . . can be plausibly
interpreted as 'John would, if
asked, assent to some sentence
that has for him the meaning
that "the window is open" has
for us'. 16
One obvious objection to Frey's con
tention that being able to' formulate
sentences is essential for believing is
that we often believe things without
formulating any sentences about them.
For example, if I reach into my pocket
for a pencil while listening to a lec
ture, I believe that I have a pencil in
my pocket, but I do not formulate the
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sentence "I have a pencil in my
pocket. "
Frey formulates the above
interpretation to meet this objection.
This interpretation is not relevant
to the objections raised so far in this
paper. Just as we can believe with
out entertaining sentences, so we can
hear, see, recognize, realize, etc.,
without entertaining sentences.
So,
since these intentional verbs take
sentences as thei r objects, they, too,
presumably, are to be interpreted in
terms of what sentences the one who
hears,
sees,
recognizes,
realizes,
etc., would assent to. Consequently,
these verbs would still not be applica
ble to infants, animals, and other
non-language users. As long as Frey
holds that these verbs properly apply
only to language users, whether he
maintains that they apply only when
we entertain sentences or can apply
as well to situations where we would
assent to sentences is unimportant.
Either way, Frey's analysis still runs
counter to ordinary usage and is
vulnerable to the above reductio.
As to whether Frey's interpretation
provides an answer to the forceful
objection that psychology does not
reveal an essential relation between
believing and sentences, the interpre
tation does not meet that objection,
either.
First, the interpretation is
arbitrary. "John would assent to the
sentence 'the window is open'" is only
one among many candidates to be a
dispositional interpretation of "John
believes that the window is open."
Other possible candidates are "John
would close the window, if asked,"
"John would close the window, if he
felt there was a draft," "John would
th row something out the window with
out attempting to open it, if he was
called upon to throw something out
the window," "John would not sit near
the window, if he was afraid of sitting
near open windows," and so forth.
Frey

provides

no

reason

for

selecting what John would assent to as
the interpretation of "John believes
that the window is open" rather than
any or all of these other things he
would do if he believed that.
But
without such an argument, it is not
obvious that what someone would
assent to is even a necessary part of
an interpretation, let alone the inter
pretation, of believing.
We do not
commonly require that an individual
assent to or even be willing to assent
to "p" in order that we feel we have
satisfactory evidence that he believes
p. We often just watch what a person
does to find out what he believes, and
we hold that "actions speak louder
than words" in expressing beliefs.
Even if a subjunctive reference to
action is a necessary part of an ade
quate understanding of belief, that
reference must be vague, for there
are many alternative sets of actions
which would commonly be considered
sufficient to confirm belief.
Common
experience with beliefs does not indi
cate that there is any particular form
of action, including assenting to sen
tences, which one must be ready to
perform in order to believe something.
I would guess that it is Frey's belief
that language is necessary for believ
i ng that leads him to interpret believ
ing in terms of assenting, but, of
cou rse, that bel ief begs the question.
Fu rthermore, it is not obvious that
"John would, if asked, assent to the
sentence 'the window is open'"
is
properly described as an interpreta
tion of "John believes that the window
If the former were an
is open."
interpretation of the latter,
then
"John believes that the window is
open but would not assent to the sen
tence 'the window is open'" would be
self-contradictory.
But it is not.
Rather, it is an instance of the com
mon idea "he believes that, but would
never admit it."
Of course, Frey
might try to meet this sort of objec
tion by qualifying his interpretation of
"John believes that the window is
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open" to read something like "John
would assent to a sentence that has
for him the meaning 'the window is
open' has for us, if as ked under con
ditions where he felt he had nothing
to gain th rough deception, did not
feel like playing a practical joke, felt
secure in disclosing what he believed,
etc." However, the effect of adding
such a ceteris paribus clause to
Frey's interpretation would be to show
just how distant is the
relation
between
believing
and
assenting.
Such a ceteris paribus clause appro
priately qualifies the relation between
something and a sign of it, not the
relation between something and its
i nterp retation.

free if he assents to that sentence;
John figu res that he can fool you by
assenting to that sentence; John
thinks he can ridicule your research
by assenting to that sentence; and
many other plausible, common expla
nations of why people assent to sen
tences.
That John believes that the
window is open may be the explanation
for his willingness to assent to "the
window is open" which we presume to
be the correct one in most cases,
which is why we presume assenting is
ordinarily a reliable sign of belief.
However, that priority of place among
explanations does not change the rela
tion between believing and willingness
to assent into one of interpretation.

Again, if "John would, if asked,
assent to the sentence 'the window is
open'" were an interpretation of "John
believes that the window is open,"
then the latter would not be a signifi
cant answer to a question as to why
John would assent to the sentence
"the window is open."
If Frey's
interpretation thesis were correct,
then John's believing that the window
is open could not explain why he
would assent to "the window is open, "
since "John believes that the window
is open" would just be another way of
saying "John would, if asked, assent
to 'the window is open'."
If Frey
were correct, citing John's belief in
response to "Why would John assent
to 'the window is open'?" would con
tain the same category mistake as
answering "Why is John a bachelor?"
with "John is a bachelor because he is
an unmarried male."
However, that
John believes that the window is open
does provide a significant answer to
the question "Why would John assent
to 'the window is open '?"
As an
explanation of why John would assent
to that sentence, that Joh n bel ieves
that the window is open is in the same
group as the following: John wants
to please you and feels that by
assenting to that sentence he will do
so; Joh n was told that he wi II be set

The problem with Frey's interpre
tation of "John believes that p" as
"John would assent to 'p' under cer
tain conditions" is that it tries to pass
off a subjunctive reference to one
thing belief can lead to as an inter
pretation of what belief is.
But
since, for the reasons just developed,
believing that p cannot be identified
with the fact that one would assent to
"p" under certain conditions, Frey
has no more succeeded in providing
us an interpretation of believing here
that Euthyphro succeeded in providing
Socrates with an interpretation of
piety when he told him that pious men
beloved
of
the
gods
(and
a re
Euthyphro's mistake would not be cor
rected by substituting "would be" for
"are" in his interpretation of piety).
Thus, Frey's proposed interpreta
tion fails, leaving his contention that
believing requires linguistic ability
vulnerable to the many counter-exam
ples of believing without using lan
guage.
Both our experience of our
own believings and our commonly,
significantly applying "believe" and
many
other
intentional
verbs
to
infants, animals, and other non-lan
guage users indicate that the fact that
these verbs take sentences as thei r
objects does not show that only those
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capable of recognizing sentences can
have those verbs meaningfully applied
to them.
(2) Frey maintains that his analy
sis is correct because we would have
to "credit [animals] with language in
order for there to be something true
or false in belief," since "sentences
are the sorts of things which [are]
capable of being true or false,
[whereas] states of affairs are not
true or false but are or are not the
case. "17 Setting aside the issue of
whether animals
possess sufficient
language or something sufficiently
language-like to satisfy this argument
without dispute, this argument still
suffers from the following problems.
First, validly inferring from beliefs
involving truth and falsity to beliefs
involving sentences requires the addi
tional premise that only sentences can
be true or false.
This is clearly
false.
Currency, portraits, friends,
signs, omens, impressions, percep
tions, examples, tools, and lines are
examples which come readily to mind
of other things that can be true or
false.
Thus, Frey's argument rests
on a false premise.
It might be countered that this
objection equivocates, since the above
examples are not all true or false in
the same way.
But such a counter
argument would just complicate the
objection a bit: if different kinds of
things can be true or false in differ
ent ways, then (a) are beliefs true/
false in the way sentences are true/
false, and (b) are sentences the only
things which are true/false in the way
sentences are true/false? If the ans
wer to either of these questions is
"no," Frey's argument still fails, since
his presumption of a very tight rela
tion between sentences and being
true/false (in the relevant sense) will
be false.
Frey does not seem to have
recognized there is an issue here, for
he provides no argument to answer

these questions.
Fu rthermore, the answer to ques
tion (b) seems to be negative; i.e.,
sentences do not seem to be the only
things that are true/false in the way
sentences are
true/false.
If
we
accept a correspondence theory of
truth for sentences, then portraits
are true/false in the way sentences
are. If we adopt a coherence theory
of truth for sentences, then omens,
impressions,
and
perceptions
are
true/false in the way sentences are.
If we adopt a pragmatic theory of
truth for sentences, then examples,
tools, and signs are true/false in the
way sentences are.
Thus, there
would seem to be sets of things which
are true/false in the way sentences
are true/false.
Beliefs may be just
another kind of thing that is true/
false in that way. So, even if beliefs
are true/false in the way sentences
are, one cannot infer from that that
beliefs are about sentences.
Second, if we were told that X and
Yare both colored or both conduct
electricity or are both beautiful or are
both complex, it would remain an open
question as to just how similar or dis
similar they
were
and
in
what
sense(s) they were or were not the
same kind of thing. In Frey's argu
ment, however, it is presumed that if
X and Y can both be true/false, that
shows that they are the same sort of
thing:
he argues that since what is
believed is that something is true and
since sentences can be true, the
something that is believed to be true
must be a sentence. But just as one
swallow does not make a summer, so
having one predicate in common pro
vides only minimal evidence concerning
in which way(s) or to what degree
those things are or are not the same
kind of thing. Frey's argument from
having the same kind of predicate to
being the same kind of thing runs
dangers analogous to those in infer
ring from similar effects to similar
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causes; consequently, that argument
requires a great deal of confirmation
from other arguments. Frey does not
provide such confi rmation, nor, as the
previous objections to his analysis
indicate, is there reason to believe
that he could find such confi rmation.
Third, in the course of developing
his argument, Frey provides counter
examples to that argument. Frey uses
such ph rases as "the false belief,"
"true and false beliefs," and "regard
ing one [belief] but not the other as
true." 18 Frey here predicates "true"
and "false" of beliefs themselves,
rather than predicating these terms of
the something that is believed.
In
making such predications he follows
ordinary usage, since we do commonly
talk about true and false beliefs, even
more commonly than we tal k about
what is believed being that something
is true or false.
However, it would
seem to follow from Frey's argument
that since beliefs can be true/false,
they are sentences, since "sentences
are the sorts of things which [are]
capable of being true or false." This
amounts to another reductio of Frey's
analysis, since saying that beliefs are
sentences clearly confuses the psy
chological with the linguistic. 19
Finally, even if we were to try to
decide whether what is believed does
or does not concern sentences on the
basis of how certain predicates are
commonly deployed when discussing
beliefs, at least as good and probably
even a better case can be made for
saying that what is believed is that
certain states of affairs are the case
than for saying that what is believed
is that certain sentences are true.
We can equally well say either "what
is believed is true" or "what is
believed is the case."
Again, in
response to a question like "Does he
really believe that?," we can equally
well respond "yes, he bel ieves that
that is true" or "yes, he believes that
that is the case." Additionally, if we
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were to ask "What makes a belief
true? ," the common answer would not
be "a belief is true if what is believed
is true" but "a belief is true if what
is believed is the case."
This sug
gest that what is true or false here

are beliefs, with what is believed
being that something is or is not the
case, and, of cou rse, as Frey himself
acknowledges, the sorts of things that
are or are not the case are not sen
tences but states of affai rs.
The
place of truth and falsity in the anal
ysis of beliefs, belief statements, and
statements and questions about beliefs
is at least not as clear as and proba
bly other than Frey suggests and his
argument requires.
Thus, Frey fails to demonstrate
that language is required for belief
and, consequently, fails to demon
strate
that
animals
cannot
have
belief-mediated desi res.
Tu rning to simple desi res, sllch as
wanting food, Frey presents the fol
lowing argument to show that the
self-consciousness required for having
such desires requires linguistic abil
ity:
I adopt the view that 'P-predi
cates',
which
include
such
things as thoughts, feelings,
memories, and perceptions, can
only be ascribed to oneself if
they can be ascribed to others
and that one can know one has
or experiences a
particular
P-predicate R only if one can
know that other people have or
experience R.
And following
Wittgenstein's private language
argument, I adopt the view
that P-predicate R, for exam
ple 'pain', does not (and can
not) have meaning by standing
for or naming a sensation to
which each of us has access in
his own case· but rather has
meaning in virtue of certain
public rules and conventions
which can be adhered to and
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transgressed, where adherence
and transgression can be pub
licly checked. In this way, I
come with Hacker to the view
that the meaningful ascription
of P-predicate R to oneself is
only possible . . . within the
context and confines of a pub
lic language. 7. U
The problem with this argument is
that it begs the question.
Frey
infers from Wittgenstein's argument
against a private language that self
consciousness
requires
knowing
a
public language.
However,
before
Frey's
argument
that
ascribing
P-predicates to oneself requires know
ing a public language even becomes
relevant to whether animals can have
simple desires, an argument is needed
to show that feeling pain, to use
Frey's example,
is
ascribing the
P-predicate "pain" to oneself.
That
is, an argument is needed to show
that self-consciousness is properly
interpreted as the linguistic activity
of ascribing certain predicates to one
self.
Psychology does not support a lin
guistic
interpretation
of
self-con
sciousness.
When II h it my thumb
with the hammer, II am conscious of
being in pain, but II do not form the
thought "I am in pain" or otherwise
ascribe the predicate "pain" to myself.
Also, interpreting my consciousness of
being in pain as the fact that I would
assent to "I am in pain," if asked,
would be. blatantly arbitrary, since
there are many things besides assent
ing to "I am in pain" which someone
in pain would natu rally (be ready to)
do, e.g., screaming and writhing.
Additionally, we may note that
Frey's argument here would lead to
the conclusion that animals are not
conscious.
Notice that in the above
citation Frey's' analysis of self-con
sciousness
in
terms of
ascribing
P-predicates to oneself is said to

apply not only to simple desires but
to "such things as thoughts, feelings,
memories, and perceptions."
If all
such things are beyond the capacities
of non-language users, saying, as
Frey does,21 that, nonetheless, they
are still conscious would seem to be
devoid of content.
How can one be
conscious, if one cannot perceive,
feel, desire,
remember, think, or
believe?
Furthermore, Frey seems to
presume that to be conscious of X
involves ascribing predicates to X (or
bei ng ready to assent to sentences
ascribing predicates to Xl. Why else
would he presume that being self-con
scious involves ascribing P-predicates
to oneself? Additionally, Frey's argu
ment is based on an analysis of the
requi rements
for
the
meani ngful
ascription of any sort of predicate,
for it is based on an analysis of what
makes language in general meaningful.
Frey does not give us any reason to
believe that bei ng conscious of oneself
is essentially tied to linguistic ability
while being conscious of other things
is not, and on the su dace of it, at
least, feeling pain does not seem to be
intimately tied to language while see
ing colors and hearing noises are not.
Consequently, if Frey's a rgument were
sound, only language users could be
conscious, which would, since Frey
maintains that animals lack linguistic
ability, exclude animals from being
conscious.
Apparently,
Frey
is
strongly opposed to denying that ani
mals are conscious, since he adamantly
rejects the suggestion that he is
denying consciousness to animals; so,
unless Frey can show that being con
scious of oneself requires linguistic
ability while being conscious of other
things does not, we have a reductio
of Frey's position here which he would
have to accept as discrediting his
attempt to deny that animals can have
simple desi res.
Thus, Frey has not provided us
any reason to doubt what we ordinar
ily believe, viz., that animals can
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desire food, water, and relief from
pain.
It follows that Frey has once
again failed to show that animals can
not meet the interest requirement for
having moral rights.
I n the cases
both of belief-mediated desi res and of
simple desires, the fundamental flaw
in Frey's argument is that he has
presumed what he claims to be show
ing, namely, that believing and self
consciousness require linguistic
lingu istic abil
ity.
III.

Conclusion

Since in our ordinary dealings with
infants, pets, and other non-language
using animals we successfully deal
with them as desiring beings who take
an interest in what pleases and pains
them and as sentient beings with
affective needs, some of which they
take an interest in and some of which

they merely have an interest in, the
bu rden of proof is su rely on Frey and
others who would deny that animals
can have desires or that the interests
of animals cannot be significantly dis
tinguished from the needs of plants
and other non-feeling things.
Since
Frey has failed to shoulder that bur
den, we may continue to rely on ordi
nary experience and to hold that ani
mals have affective needs and that
they have complex and simple desi res
concerning the fulfillment or frustra
tion of those needs, as well as desi res
concerning things that are not really
in thei r best interest, such as playing
in the street.
It follows that both
horns of Frey's dilemma are blunt and
harmless, for whether one analyzes
"interests" in terms of having an
interest or taking an interest, animals
meet the interest requirement for hav
ing moral rights. 22
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